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Abstract 
The development of Integrated Offender Management (IOM) approaches have spread 
rapidly across England and Wales since 2009 when IOM was acknowledged by 
Government through the Home Office policy statement. The MoJ commissioned process 
evaluation of the five IOM pioneer sites (Senior et al 2011) found that assessing the 
impact and benefits of IOM was difficult given the definitional issues of IOM and problems 
in identifying additionality. To date, this remains a challenge for local agencies, despite 
attempts to facilitate this, such as the IOM efficiency toolkit (Home Office and MoJ 2011). 
This paper will examine the challenges and limitations of the methodologies employed 
and will identify what lessons can be learned for evaluating other criminal justice 
initiatives such as Payment by Results schemes where definitions of interventions and 
additionality may be difficult to determine. 
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Introduction 
Evidencing the impact and financial benefits of Integrated Offender Management (IOM) 
has been a challenge for Government and local agencies ever since IOM was recognised by 
the Government through Home Office guidance in 2009.   IOM came to prominence when 
reductions in public finance commenced due to the economic crisis a year earlier.  Given 
its widespread adoption across England and Wales, evidencing the impact and cost 
effectiveness of IOM has become the holy grail for local agencies and Government.  It is 
particularly pertinent at this moment in England and Wales. The continuation of IOM at a 
local level is potentially under threat from the Government’s Transforming Rehabilitation 
strategy (Ministry of Justice 2013a).  It is perhaps ironic that IOM approaches based on the 
principle of more effectively joining up provision (Senior et al 2011) may potentially be 
dismantled by the fragmentation of community based offender management services as 
envisaged by Transforming Rehabilitation.  The MoJ strategy sets out a division between 
the management of high risk offenders by public probation services and the marketization 
of services to manage low to medium risk offenders by private, voluntary sector and 
mutual organisations commissioned by Payment by Results (PbR). 
 
This article will commence with a brief history of IOM.  It will then define IOM and 
consider: the challenges of assessing the additionality of IOM, i.e. what changes to process 
and interventions have occurred as a result of IOM; the methodologies used to evaluate 
the impact of IOM and their limitations; the implications of this for the evaluation of IOM 
and other criminal justice services following the implementation of Transforming 
Rehabilitation; and will consider the risks for IOM arising from the implementation of 
Transforming Rehabilitation.   
 
A brief history of IOM 
Senior et al (2011) noted that IOM was (at the time of writing the report) the most 
developed attempt to operationalize the concept of end to end offender management 
conceptualised in the ASPIRE model (Grapes et al 2006) produced by the National 
Offender Management Service (NOMS). 
 
“At its best an IOM approach aimed to co-ordinate all relevant agencies to 
deliver interventions for offenders identified as warranting intensive 
engagement, whatever their statutory status. It also sought to ensure, by 
support and disruption (of potential further offending), the continued 
commitment by offenders to engage in interventions offered with the 
express purpose of reducing further offending.” (Senior et al 2011: i) 
 
IOM sought to replicate for targeted groups of adult offenders what had been mandated 
for youth justice, through the establishment of Youth Offending Teams (YOTs) by the 
Crime and Disorder Act 1998. YOTs comprised multi-agency teams drawn from: social 
services, police, probation, health and voluntary and community sector agencies (VCS). 
Teams were co-located and provided multi-agency case management of young offenders. 
The development of IOM at the pioneer sites (Senior et al 2011) was informed by: 
resettlement strategies to improve and co-ordinate provision for short term sentenced 
prisoners (under 12 months) released from custody; criticisms of the silo mentality 
Integrated offender management: assessing the impact and benefits - holy grail or fool's errand? 
61 
between probation and prison services identified by Carter (2003); the concept of 
‘Custody Plus’ in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which was intended to offer provision to 
short term sentenced prisoners; and the development of multi-agency planning and 
interventions based on seven reducing re-offending pathways. 
 
During the IOM pioneer initiative which ran from 2008 to 2011 the Home Office acquired 
the lead responsibility within Government for IOM.  This is something of an anomaly.  
Overall responsibility for offender management lies with the MoJ which now oversees 
prison, probation and youth justice services.  IOM represents a good example of the 
tensions inherent in splitting the responsibility for criminal justice policy across these two 
competing Government departments. Fox et al (2013) commented that the operational 
and commissioning responsibilities for offender management in England and Wales are 
complicated by 112 public prisons, 35 probation trusts and 12 private prisons operating 
under the aegis of the National Offender Management service; the operational arm of the 
MoJ.  This is further complicated by the Home Office having responsibility for the 43 police 
forces across England and Wales who have a significant role to play in IOM. Senior and 
colleagues (2011) reported that the involvement of the police in offender management 
was perhaps one of the most distinctive elements of IOM.  
 
The strategic responsibility for IOM is shared locally between 322 community safety 
partnerships10 (CSPs) and 41 local criminal justice boards (LCJBs) in England and Wales.  
This reflects the parallel responsibilities of the Home Office for CSPs and the Ministry of 
Justice for LCJBs and the respective reach of these departments at a local and regional 
level.  Arguably the reach of the Home Office has been strengthened through the 
appointment of Police and Crime Commissioners in November 2012.  They are responsible 
to the Home Office at a Governmental level and ostensibly the electorate at a regional 
level11. It is too early to say to what extent the PCC will impact on IOM or offender 
management more generally.  Critically, the PCC will have no direct responsibility for the 
commissioning of offender management services within their areas, under Transforming 
Rehabilitation (2013a) this remains at a central level with NOMS. 
 
What IOM seeks to achieve at an operational level is the joining up of services to address 
offending and re-offending, something which, arguably, Government fails to achieve at a 
national policy level. That the Home Office has the lead on IOM within Government may 
facilitate the continuation of IOM.  Amid the shake-up of offender management services 
arising from the implementation of Transforming Rehabilitation (Ministry of Justice 
2013a), the Home Office will be keen to retain its IOM foothold in offender management, 
nationally and locally.  There are 67 IOM schemes across England and Wales, based on 
information provided by local areas to the IOM E-Learning Portal12.  While this is not 
comprehensive, it provides a measure of IOM proliferation.  It should be noted that some 
                                                 
10 Community Safety Partnerships acquired a statutory responsibility to reduce re-offending through 
the Policing and Crime Act 2009 
11 The electoral mandate of PCCs was challenged by commentators given the low turnout  
12 The IOM E-Learning Portal was commissioned by the Home Office in 2011 and is hosted and 
managed by the Hallam Centre for Community Justice at Sheffield Hallam University.  The portal can 
be accessed at: http://www.cjp.org.uk/iom-elearning/ 
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of these schemes cover metropolitan and rural counties, while others operate over 
smaller geographical areas, unitary authorities and towns. 
 
Defining IOM 
In practice terms, IOM has developed from existing multi-agency case management 
practice (Senior et al 2011): Prolific and other Priority Offenders (PPO) Programme; Drug 
Intervention Programme (DIP); and Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements 
(MAPPA) for the most serious sexual and violent offenders. One of the strengths of IOM is 
that it has largely developed as a ‘bottom up’ innovation. In evaluation terms, this is one 
of its weaknesses.  Attempting to identify the additionality of IOM, i.e. what local agencies 
were doing differently as a result of IOM was difficult across the IOM Pioneer sites as they 
had developed in different ways.  It still remains difficult, given local variations between 
schemes.  It has been further complicated by the Government guidance on IOM (Home 
Office 2009) summarised by Senior et al (2013) as: 
 
“IOM was to be the strategic umbrella that brought together agencies 
across government to prioritise intervention with offenders causing crime in 
their locality; IOM was to build on and expand current offender-focused and 
public protection approaches, such as PPO, DIP and MAPPA; and IOM should 
relate to all agencies engaged in Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) and 
Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs) with direction and support in bringing 
together the management of repeat offenders into a more coherent 
structure” (Senior et al, 2011: 2-3) 
 
This suggests that IOM operates at different levels, which adds complexity to the 
evaluation process. Trying to identify what is to be evaluated is not straightforward.  It 
prompts the following questions: 
 
• Is IOM a strategic process for bringing together agencies to tackle 
offenders in their localities?  
• Is it an extension of existing offender management processes?   
• Is it a way of bringing more coherence to the management of repeat 
offenders through two different multi-agency structures CSPs and LCJBs?   
 
What IOM is not, is a clearly defined criminal justice intervention such as the Intensive 
Alternatives to Custody (IAC) pilots (Wong et al 2012a).  These were being implemented 
around the same time as IOM officially commenced.  IAC was a much easier pilot to 
evaluate given that the aim of the programme was clear; to test out the use of intensive 
community orders to divert offenders from short term custodial sentences. 
 
As IOM has developed in local areas, it has become easier to more tightly define IOM for 
evaluation purposes.  This is illustrated by Wong and colleagues (2011), who undertook a 
process and impact evaluation in one county area in England. Based on a documentation 
review and interviews and workshops with local stakeholders, they were able to define 
IOM as having the following components: 
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• Selection and de-selection of IOM offenders; 
• Case management of IOM offenders through: one to one case 
management by a dedicated offender manager; day to day offender 
management by co-located staff from different agencies; multi-agency 
case conferencing on a regular weekly or monthly basis; 
• Reducing re-offending pathways interventions responding to the case 
management activities; 
• Police enforcement/other activities such as intelligence gathering resulting 
from the case management activities. 
  
Assessing Additionality 
At the same time as being commissioned to undertake a process evaluation of the five 
IOM pioneer sites, Senior et al (2011) were commissioned to undertake an impact 
feasibility study and a break even analysis of IOM.  Neither of these studies were 
published by the MoJ.  One of the difficulties inherent in undertaking an impact evaluation 
and break even analysis of the IOM pioneer sites was that of identifying the additionality 
of IOM.  While it is not possible to reference either of the MoJ commissioned reports, the 
difficulties in identifying additionality can be found in the process evaluation report 
(Senior et al 2011).  Some of these are considered below. 
 
Identifying a start point for IOM 
“Sexual intercourse began in ninety sixty three (which was rather late for me) - At the end 
of the Chatterley ban and the Beatles’ first LP.” opined Philip Larkin in his poem Annus 
Mirabilus (1974).  In a similar vein, the 2009 Home Office guidance marked the official 
commencement of Integrated Offender Management (IOM), although arguably it had 
started much earlier in some areas of England and Wales.  As reported by Senior et al 
(2011), some of the five IOM ‘Pioneer sites’ had received funding in 2008/09 to develop 
their IOM approaches.  It could be argued that IOM started then, however, some of the 
Pioneer sites viewed IOM as commencing as early as 2006, at the point when they 
adopted multi-agency case management processes (ibid).  While this may appear to be 
giving too much attention to something relatively unimportant, identifying when IOM 
commenced in a local area is not merely an issue of historical accuracy but a critical issue 
for evaluating IOM.  
 
During workshops undertaken at each of the IOM Pioneer sites, individuals involved in 
delivering and managing IOM were asked to identify when IOM started.  Respondents at 
the individual sites came up with start dates that varied between each other, in some 
instances by several years. In part their difficulties in agreeing a start date seem to stem 
from IOM being "built on pre-existing schemes and approaches" (Senior et al 2011). 
 
The intervention cohort 
One of the distinctive features of IOM at the pioneer sites was the inclusion of non-
statutory offenders (i.e. offenders sentenced to less than 12 months in custody) within the 
IOM cohort - something that could be identified as additionality.  However, the proportion 
of non-statutory offenders within IOM varied across the sites.  Senior et al (2011) noted 
that Lancashire had the lowest proportion, just over a third (34%) of cases under statutory 
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supervision. West Yorkshire had the highest proportion at around three quarters (74%). In 
relation to PPOs, Lancashire had the lowest proportion just over one in five (22%) in the 
scheme, and Nottinghamshire had the highest proportion at seven in ten IOM offenders. 
The additional prioritisation of the non-statutory adult offender group was clearly more 
pronounced as a proportion of the workload in Lancashire than the other sites. What 
these figures also demonstrate is the inclusion of PPO offenders within the IOM cohort, 
some of whom were statutory and non-statutory offenders.  This arrangement further 
illustrates the difficulties of both identifying a starting point for IOM and a distinct 
intervention cohort that had not previously received some form of IOM, albeit as a PPO or 
a DIP offender. 
 
The diversity of approaches to IOM  
Senior et al (2011) identified a "compendium of different approaches across the sites" 
which "limited the ability to closely compare each separate initiative."(Senior et al 
2011:12)  This was perhaps inevitable given that IOM was characterised by "bottom up 
development in local areas which achieved a collective description of IOM". (Senior et al 
2011:3)   These differences were illustrated by the different geographical areas covered by 
the scheme.  As noted by Senior et al (2011): 
 
"Bristol and Nottingham had a city focus, though the latter began to expand 
throughout the county during the evaluation. Although Lancashire had 
recently expanded the development of IOM beyond the Pennine police 
division, this evaluation focused on Burnley, Rossendale and Pendle local 
authorities (LAs). West Midlands IOM was the last to develop, located in  two 
LAs, Walsall and Wolverhampton. Across West Yorkshire each of the hubs 
located in five LAs developed in unique ways." (Senior et al 2011: 12) 
 
Case study in identifying the additionality for IOM 
More recently focussing on a single county, with a shared county wide model of IOM with 
a specified in-scope cohort of offenders has made it easier to identify what constitutes 
additionality (Wong et al 2011).  Table 1 reproduced from this study captures the 
additionality of IOM for PPO offenders across the county, identifying practices and 
processes before and after IOM across three local authority areas.  While PPO offenders 
were not the sole group of offenders included in IOM, they were the cohort of offenders 
for whom the differences in practice were most easily identified by practitioners.
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Table 1: Additionality of IOM for PPOs taken from a single county across three local authority 
areas (which illustrates variations between them) 
 Before IOM After IOM 
Selection/De 
selection 
• PPO scoring matrix used 
 
• Same scoring matrix used 
• PPO matrix; red, amber, green 
One to one 
case 
management 
• PPOs were seen 3 times a week 
• 1 police officer dealt with PPOs 
• Police and probation working on 
all cases 
• Statutory cases managed by 
probation 
• PPOs are seen 4 times a week 
• Probation led with a police officer and a 
sergeant (in one site) 
• Probation led (in another site) 
• Broader access to pathways 
• PPOs are seen 4 times a week 
Day to day 
offender 
management 
(due to co 
location) 
• Police and probation co-located 
• Information sharing difficult 
• A PPO probation officer, PPO 
offender supervisor and a PPO 
police officer 
• Co-location started with PPOs 
• Less instant access to agencies 
• Police and probation co-located 
• Existing PPO team joined by further 
probation officers and a new police officer 
• Accommodation worker within co-located 
team of police and probation 
• Access to police and more home visits; 
easier to refer. Prison officer also co-
located. 
Multi-agency 
case 
conferencing 
• Previously all cases were 
considered 
• Regular PPO meeting each 
month 
• Weekly internal meeting 
• The focus is on those who are causing the 
most concern 
• All cases now considered at operational 
meetings on a traffic light basis 
• Weekly tasking meetings for IOM are held 
at probation 
• Monthly meeting which includes all 
agencies and partners 
Pathways 
interventions 
from case 
management 
• Each pathways strand separate 
from one another 
• Probation staff working with 
discrete groups of offenders 
• Links not as good for the key 
areas 
• Limited provision 
• All of the pathways interventions have 
been pulled together and there is more 
multi-agency working and information 
sharing 
• Multi agency working widened to more 
offenders and staff working to a broader 
remit in terms of offender types 
• More intensive level of support  
• Job Centre Plus and Citizens Advice 
Bureau are being co-located with the IOM 
team 
Police 
activity from 
case 
management 
• Police worked solely with PPOs 
• Only one police officer (who had 
other responsibilities) 
• Due to PPO work there have 
always been links between 
probation and police 
• Increase in number of police officers in 
team working across IOM and getting 
intelligence on the offenders 
• Police able to widen the net to a multi 
agency staged approach including closer 
monitoring 
• Police actively targeting non-statutory cases 
• More police home visits are made and 
communication has improved 
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While the problem of additionality was resolved in this study, challenges in undertaking an 
impact evaluation (based on impact on re-offending) remained; the three areas 
commenced IOM at different times which straddled a seven month period. 
 
The solution adopted for the reconviction study was to identify a point in time when a 
sufficient number of offenders commenced on IOM across all the three areas.  This 
provided a large county wide intervention cohort and a sufficient number from each area 
to allow comparisons to be made between the areas. 
 
Applying an Experimental Paradigm to Evaluating IOM 
The requirement to undertake an impact feasibility study for IOM and an impact feasibility 
study for IAC, commissioned by the MoJ in 2009 as part of the evaluations for both 
initiatives provided an indicator of the MoJ's intent to pursue an experimental approach to 
testing new initiatives.  However, in both cases an impact study was never commissioned. 
The experimental paradigm is best illustrated by Sherman and colleagues who developed 
the Scientific Methods Scale in which evaluation designs are ranked according to their 
level of internal validity (ibid.). Randomised Control Trials are identified as the most 
rigorous evaluation design and quasi-experiments in which a comparison group is used are 
established as the ‘next best thing’. The full scale is as follows: 
 
Level 1 Correlation between a crime prevention program and a measure of 
crime or crime risk factors at a single point in time. 
Level 2 Temporal sequence between the program and the crime or risk 
outcome clearly observed, or the presence of a comparison group without 
demonstrated comparability to the treatment group. 
Level 3 A comparison between two or more comparable units of analysis, 
one with and one without the program. 
Level 4 Comparison between multiple units with and without the program, 
controlling for other factors, or using comparison units that evidence only 
minor differences. 
Level 5 Random assignment and analysis of comparable units to program 
and comparison groups. 
(Sherman et al.1998: 5-6) 
 
For Sherman et al, a programme could only be classed as ‘working’ if it had at least two 
Level 3 evaluations and all the available evidence to demonstrate effectiveness. 
 
The challenges of adopting an experimental paradigm for IOM were examined in an 
options analysis undertaken by Wong et al (2011) for the evaluation of the county based 
scheme mentioned above.  After reviewing the options with the commissioners a 
‘combined Levels’ option was adopted, comprising: a Level 2 analysis, comparing re-
offending of IOM offenders before and after commencement on IOM using Police National 
Computer data on reconvictions; and (arguably) a Level 4 analysis13 comparing actual re-
offending for 12 and 24 months following commencement on IOM with predicted rates of 
                                                 
13 The Maryland Scale devised by Sherman et al in 1998 did not take into account the capability to 
use a rigorously tested methodology for predicting re-offending 
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re-offending for the IOM cohort using a rigorously tested MoJ methodology (Howard et al 
2009). 
 
To understand the difficulties of adopting an experimental approach, it is worth reviewing 
why the other options were discounted.  The reasons from Wong et al (2011) are 
summarised below. 
 
• Level 1 - This was the most limited analytical approach.  It would not have 
been possible to attribute any differences to IOM 
• Level 3 - The fundamental problem with identifying a closely matched 
comparator cohort was the need to obtain this cohort from a time pre-
dating IOM.  The re-offending of the comparator cohort would not be 
tracked over the same time period as the IOM cohort. 
• Level 4 – It was not possible to undertake a matched pairs design as used 
for the Diamond Initiative evaluation (Dawson et al 2011) because it was 
not possible to identify matching individuals (based on re-offending 
history and needs) within the study area who were not going to receive 
IOM.  If they fulfilled the selection criteria for IOM they were on IOM.  It 
was also not possible to identify matching individuals from other 
comparable areas who did not receive IOM – given the proliferation of 
some form of IOM across the whole of England and Wales.   By 
comparison with IOM schemes that were established before and after the 
Diamond Initiative (which commenced in 2009) the Diamond Initiative was 
a relatively tightly prescribed case management intervention for non-
statutory offenders.  In addition it operated in six London Boroughs; 
therefore it was possible to identify matched individuals from other 
London wards who did not receive Diamond (ibid). 
• Level 5 – It was not possible to undertake a randomised control trial as this 
would have required re-designing the delivery of IOM in the study area. 
 
The Challenge of Measuring Impact on Re-offending 
Since the commissioning of the evaluation of the IOM Pioneer sites in 2009, the challenges 
of evidencing the impact of IOM have remained constant. These challenges could equally 
be applied to the evaluation of any criminal justice intervention; therefore they are 
illustrative and arguably have a wider application beyond IOM. 
 
The primary directive for criminal justice services in England and Wales, particularly those 
targeted at offenders has (not unnaturally) been reducing re-offending. This is the stated 
goal of the MoJ confirmed in various policy documents (Ministry of Justice 2010, 2012, 
2013a).  The goal in itself is not problematic, however applying the MoJ ‘standard’ for 
measuring re-offending; reconvictions as recorded on the Police National Computer (PNC) 
database is challenging.  The three main difficulties are examined below. 
 
Accessing PNC data 
Accessing anonymised individualised PNC data to assess the impact of IOM is a protracted 
process. In the recent past this has involved submitting a request to the Police National 
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Computer/Database Information Access Panel (PIAP) board which met once every three 
months. The author and colleagues experience is that while PIAP approved the request, 
fulfilling the request was held in abeyance due to the capacity of the MoJ which provides 
PNC data to meet the PIAP approved requests. In the past the MoJ was not involved in the 
PIAP decision process, which led to applications being approved which the MoJ had 
insufficient capacity to meet.  In fairness to the MoJ, their principal problem has and 
continues to be that of capacity, they have had insufficient numbers of staff to deal with 
these ‘external requests’, while at the same time servicing the data demands of the MoJ 
staff, ministers and MPs. Requests for PNC data have grown, as statutory, private and 
voluntary and community sector agencies have realised that in order to maintain their 
services and/or funding for them, they need to evidence their impact on reducing re-
offending. What this scenario illustrates is the mismatch between the policy aspiration of 
Government and the lack of capacity at a central level to adequately service it. 
 
Timeframe for measuring impact  
The MoJ ‘standard’ for measuring re-offending has become assessing reconvictions in the 
twelve months following commencement on an intervention, with a six month lag to allow 
convictions to be processed through the court system. It is therefore a minimum of 
eighteen months before any analysis is even undertaken.  For most commissioners of 
services and/or those involved in delivering services this appears to be a long time to wait 
for results. This is particularly the case where public sector budgeting occurs on a twelve 
month cycle. 
 
Capability to analyse PNC data 
As noted by Fox et al 2013b, the analytical capability of public sector agencies has 
diminished over the last few years due to reductions in public finance. This has led to 
staffing reductions and maintaining front line delivery capability at the expense of back 
office functions.  As to the voluntary and community sector, there is limited evidence that 
this capability exists or ever existed.  As noted by Senior (2004), Mills (2010), and Wong et 
al (2012), VCS agencies struggle quantitatively to evidence the impact of their services 
using their own data, let alone data from another source.  The creation of the MoJ 
Datalab14 is intended to address the problem of access and to some extent the capability 
to analyse PNC data by any agency.  However, discussions between the author and MoJ 
staff suggest there are methodological limitations to this.  Providing agencies are able to 
collate the relevant PNC identifiers for the cohort of offenders (a minimum of at least fifty) 
that the agency has worked with, the MoJ will be able to supply a binary measure of re-
offending, i.e. whether reoffended or not. This will compare the re-offending rates of the 
cohort with a matched comparison cohort.  However, the MoJ will not be able to identify 
whether or not this matched cohort will or will not have received an intervention the 
same as or similar to the intervention deployed by the agency. Therefore the observed 
difference between the two cohorts may be very small or non-existent. 
                                                 
14 Details of the Justice Data Lab can be found at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/justice-data-lab 
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The relationship between researchers, the commissioners and 
other research stakeholders 
At a Government level, evaluation evidence is just one component of the policy making 
process. Policy-makers also draw on their own experience, expertise and judgement 
(Davies 2004). Policy-making also takes place within the context of finite resources which 
influences decisions (ibid.). It is also influenced by the values, habits and traditions of 
institutions such as Parliament, civil servants and the judiciary (ibid.). Outside forces such 
as lobby groups, pressure groups and consultants are able to influence the policy-making 
process and the whole policy-making process is subject to pragmatics and contingencies 
such as parliamentary terms and timetables and the capacities of institutions (ibid.). Thus, 
many commentators prefer the phrase ‘evidence-informed policy’ (e.g. Treadwell, Shine 
and Bartley 2011). 
 
As Senior (2013) notes similar issues arise outside Government commissioned evaluations: 
 
“Contract research was often commissioned in response to an external need 
to validate the ongoing project work. This could be particularly the case in 
small voluntary and community sector (VCS) projects, where the uncertainty 
of project funding often required an independent piece of research to 
validate how successful the programme had been before further funding 
would be allocated. The pressure to produce a piece of work that was 
descriptive of the project but did not essentially challenge the aims was 
acute.” (Senior 2013: 365) 
 
Asymmetric relationship 
Advocates of the cultural cognition of risk15 such as Dan Kahan suggests there is an 
asymmetric relationship in relation to technical knowledge and understanding between 
scientists and the general public:  
 
“…our argument is that cultural commitments operate as a kind of heuristic 
in the rational processing of information on public policy matters….citizens 
aren’t in a position to figure out through personal investigation whether the 
death penalty deters, gun control undermines public safety, commerce 
threatens the environment, et cetera. They have to take the word of those 
whom they trust on issues of what sorts of empirical claims, and what sorts 
of data supporting such claims, are credible.”  (Kahan and Braman 2006: 
149) 
 
Arguably, such an asymmetric relationship also exists between researchers, research 
commissioners and other stakeholders, such as those delivering the evaluated 
intervention. 
 
This has a number of facets: 
                                                 
15 The “cultural cognition of risk” refers to the tendency of individuals to form risk perceptions that 
are congenial to their values. 
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• Commissioners and other stakeholders being able to fully understand the 
methodology employed, the level of rigour attached to it and therefore 
the reliability and validity of the results 
• Commissioners and other stakeholders understanding the limitations of an 
impact evaluation. While an impact evaluation may be able to identify an 
effect arising from an intervention such as IOM, it will not (on its own) be 
able to explain why an effect occurred and how this could be replicated. 
This is explored later in the article in relation to the limitations of the 
experimental paradigm. 
 
In practice, for most commissioners and other stakeholders, the appropriateness of the 
methodology and the results of an impact and economic evaluation then largely becomes 
an article of faith, determined by: the trust in the research team; and the results 
themselves.  However, as Kahan and Braman (2006) note, in relation to the public and 
their trust in empirical evidence, they are more likely to give credence to evidence from 
scientists: 
 
“…who share their values—and who as a result of this same dynamic and 
others are predisposed to a particular view.” (Kahan and Braman 2006: 149 ) 
 
In a similar way, the level of trust placed in the research team, is in large part based on a 
combination of: the track record of the research team in relation to previous research 
assignments and who they have been commissioned by; the relationship that has been 
forged between the research team, commissioners and other research stakeholders 
during the evaluation process. 
 
The results themselves, whether they are viewed as positive or negative will have a 
bearing on this asymmetric relationship. As Senior (2013) noted there is often a tension in 
contract research between validation and evaluation.  The research work undertaken by 
the author and colleagues on IOM has been commissioned via the contract research 
route.  As observed by Senior, contract research is generally commissioned “in response to 
a need to externally validate the ongoing project work” (Senior 2013: 365).  At the point 
when the IOM evaluations were conducted, they were already ongoing with a general 
presumption by the local agencies involved in commissioning and delivering them that 
they should continue.  The desire for validation rather than evaluation can be 
undermining. Senior (2013) recounts the tactics deployed by a site lead from a multi-site 
government funded project whose aim was to discredit the evaluation results.  These 
tactics included: 
 
“detailed questioning of evidence presented; questioning the researchers’ 
understanding of the local context; comparing ‘inappropriately compiled’ 
statistics from their site to the other two sites; delays in providing necessary 
data; cancelling of research interviews; refusing to allow certain workers to 
be interviewed without the project leader’s presence; and dismissing the 
views of the subordinate player, the service users, by claiming that they 
were an unrepresentative sample, despite providing the sample 
themselves.” (Senior 2013: 366) 
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Burden of communication 
The asymmetry of the relationship between the research team, commissioners and 
research stakeholders in relation to technical know-how, is perhaps (rightly) replicated in 
relation to explaining the research process and the results – with the burden of 
responsibility lying with the research team. When agencies are commissioning research, in 
particular quantitative research such as impact and economic evaluations, they are 
arguably not only commissioning researchers to provide the technical expertise but also 
the expertise in communicating the process and results.  The implications of this are that 
the research team have a considerable responsibility for: 
 
• Being transparent in explaining the methodologies being employed and 
the limitations of these at every stage of the evaluation process 
• Taking care when writing research reports to explain the results and 
methodology in plain language and perhaps as a key test, in a way which 
allows the commissioners and research stakeholders themselves to be 
able to confidently communicate the results to others who have had little 
or no exposure to the research process 
 
Taking care in presenting positive results so that the limitations of the results are properly 
understood is important, however communicating ‘negative results’ and managing 
expectations is perhaps the greater challenge. 
 
A striking example of this is illustrated by the following excerpt taken from the foreword 
to the Final Evaluation Report of the Diamond Initiative (Dawson et al 2011).  
 
“At the time of the Interim Report, no definite conclusions could be drawn 
about the results of the Diamond Initiative, but there were a number of 
reasons for cautious optimism. It was of course right, in the interests of 
accountability and transparency, to state these reasons in the Interim 
Report. But we live in a complex world where crime issues are of great 
political interest, and a 24-hour media culture is voracious in its search for 
stories. So publication of the Interim Report had the effect of increasing the 
already high political profile of the Diamond Initiative. Under pressure from 
the media and others to declare Diamond an unqualified success, SRAU 
researchers and members of the ARG found themselves having resolutely to 
insist that the research was not yet completed, and that it would be 
inappropriate to act prematurely on interim results. This Final Report on the 
results of the research justifies the earlier caution. After a very careful and 
thorough evaluation, SRAU researchers have concluded that the assessment 
of the crime reductive potential of the Diamond Initiative must be less 
encouraging than appeared to be the case from the data available at the 
time of the Interim Report."(Dawson et al 2011: Foreword, no page number) 
 
Satisficing 
As illustrated in the above excerpt, a wide range of individuals have a stake in the results 
of any evaluation.  In the case of IOM, these have included: those commissioning the 
evaluation, who may be one of the agencies involved in delivering IOM or an agency with 
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a co-ordinating responsibility for criminal justice services in the local area; the plethora of 
agencies involved in delivering IOM from strategic manager through to front line 
practitioner; a commissioner of one of the services which contributes to IOM, for example, 
an NHS commissioner of mental health services; a local councillor with responsibility for 
the community safety portfolio or just a local councillor whose constituents have 
particular concerns about crime and/or offenders in their local area; and more recently 
the Police and Crime Commissioner. 
 
Each of these stakeholders have their own interest in the results of any evaluation. Their 
response to any results (positive or negative) will inevitably be refracted through this and 
coloured by their understanding of the methodology and the extent to which they 
perceive this to be robust and legitimate. 
 
This is illustrated by examples based on the author’s experience of evaluating IOM in two 
different areas. In one area in England, the commissioners indicated that their preferred 
methodology for assessing the impact of IOM was a before and after comparison – a level 
2 on the Maryland Scale in preference to a potential level 3 which would provide a more 
rigorous assessment.  Their rationale was that a before and after comparison was 
something that elected members would more easily understand. 
 
In a similar vein, in a different area of England, where both a level 3 and level 2 evaluation 
were undertaken, the commissioners chose to highlight the results from the level 2 (the 
before and after comparison) and not the more rigorous level 3. 
 
Limitations of the experimental approach 
Experimental criminology provides an approach to evaluation that, it is claimed, will 
provide policy-makers and practitioner with reliable evidence about what works. 
However, as noted by Pawson: 
 
“Evaluation research is tortured by time constraints. The policy cycle 
revolves quicker than the research cycle, with the result that ‘real time’ 
evaluations often have little influence on policy making.”(Pawson 2002: 157) 
 
In the case of IOM, despite the lack of robust quantitative evidence of effectiveness - to 
the standard advanced by Sherman et al (1998), this has not prevented its widespread 
implementation across England and Wales, encouraged and supported by Government.  
This is because at a local level, it is attractive to policy makers and practitioners.  Firstly, 
the rationale behind IOM is plausible, in short, that better joined up working between 
agencies (in particular the police and probation) should improve the management of 
offenders, which should lead to a reduction in re-offending.  Secondly, because IOM is 
based on existing multi-agency case management arrangements it has been a relatively 
easy innovation to implement.  Applying the “engines of innovation” identified by Innes 
(2013) for policing practice to the development of IOM, locally, IOM has benefited from a 
“’bottom up” form of innovation which Innes describes as follows: 
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“Practice entrepreneurship based innovation involves highly localised 
attempts to resolve a particular situation, being transferred and diffused 
more widely. As implied by the name, the defining quality of practice 
entrepreneurship is it is practically oriented, rather than being derived from 
abstract concepts and theories.” (Innes 2013: 22) 
 
IOM as innovation driven by practice entrepreneurship does not lend itself to the 
experimental paradigm for generating evidence of effectiveness.  In fact, as Pawson and 
Tilley have argued, the experimental approach to assessing the effectiveness of criminal 
justice interventions: 
 
“…constitutes a heroic failure, promising so much and yet ending up in ironic 
anticlimax. The underlying logic…seems meticulous, clear-headed and 
militarily precise, and yet findings seem to emerge in a typically non-
cumulative, low impact, prone-to-equivocation sort of way.”(Pawson and 
Tilley 1997: 8) 
 
In the case of IOM, arguably, the context–mechanism–outcome approach advocated by 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) may be more appropriate than the experimental and quasi-
experimental approach. 
 
"Programs work (have successful outcomes) only in so far as they introduce 
the appropriate ideas and opportunities (mechanisms) to groups in the 
appropriate social and cultural conditions (contexts)."(Pawson and Tilley 
1997: 57) 
 
The recent evaluations of the MoJ PbR pilots appear to have adopted this context – 
mechanism – outcome approach as illustrated by the research questions which the Local 
Justice Reinvestment Pilot Evaluation is intended to answer: 
 
“1. What actions did local partners take to reduce crime, re-offending and 
demand on the criminal justice system, and why? 
2. (How) Did the actions of local partners contribute to better criminal 
justice system outcomes (including reduced first-time offending, re-
offending and criminal justice system demand)? 
3. What were the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the project as 
implemented? 
4. Were there any unintended consequences/impacts on other parts of the 
criminal justice system and/or crime in the area (or neighbouring areas), 
and/or were any perverse incentives created?” 
(Wong et al 2013a: 8) 
 
While this approach appears to have been understood and adopted at a Government 
level, the author’s experience of evaluating IOM and other criminal justice interventions 
suggests that it has yet to happen for commissioners and consumers of evaluations 
outside Government, i.e. regional and local public sector commissioners, charitable trusts 
and public, private and voluntary sector service providers. 
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This is an important issue, given the Transforming Rehabilitation proposals and the black 
box approach which is the key feature of Payment by Results commissioning.  In effect 
Government have devolved the responsibility for identifying what works to service 
providers, crucially, without testing whether service providers are up to the task.  The 
experience of IOM suggests that they may not be.  This is further confirmed by the interim 
evaluation report of the Local Justice Reinvestment Pilot where Wong and colleagues 
(2013a) found that (except in one site) there was limited use of evidence to determine 
which interventions to implement and limited evidence of monitoring performance 
against the outcome metrics.  In part this appeared to be due to the financial climate and 
the design of the pilot: a reward payment structure with up front funding and limited 
incentives for local agencies to invest in doing anything substantially different. 
 
What next for evaluating impact and cost effectiveness? 
What are the implications of the above for the delivery of criminal justice interventions 
targeted at offenders? 
 
The delivery of offender management services to low to medium risk offenders including 
non-statutory offenders will become day to day, bread and butter work for the private and 
voluntary sector agencies which win the Transforming Rehabilitation contracts.  
 
There is an expectation that the reward payment (which forms part of the payment 
structure) will incentivise innovation by providers.  As demonstrated by the Local Justice 
Reinvestment pilot this is not necessarily a given (Wong et al 2013a). 
 
Assuming that Tier 1, 2 and 3 providers will experiment with different forms of offender 
management (although delivered primarily by the Tier 1 provider), there will be a need to 
monitor this closely. 
 
As suggested by Tim Harford, Financial Times Journalist, broadcaster and author of “Adapt 
Why success starts with failure”,  there are three essential steps to successful adaptations: 
 
“…try new things, in the expectation that some will fail; make failure 
survivable because it will be common; and to make sure that you know 
when you’ve failed.”(Harford 2011: 36) 
 
What this means for service providers whether they are the Tier 1, 2 or 3 provider, is the 
increased importance of encouraging a culture of openness and honesty in developing 
new services and/or changing services.  Developing a culture that accepts that when 
services innovate, some things may work and others may not work.  Embracing such a 
culture would have avoided the disruption tactics employed by the pilot site lead 
recounted by Senior (2013) in his review of the politics of contract research quoted above. 
 
In order to know when you’ve failed, requires providers to be much more disciplined 
about defining their interventions and the additionality of the intervention, where they 
are aiming to do something different to what they were doing before.  This means 
avoiding the fuzziness of IOM, i.e. being unclear about when it started, whether or not it 
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was an umbrella term, a strategic process; a new operational process, an adaptation of an 
existing process, a widening of the intervention cohort or all of them. 
 
To make failure survivable, it would be prudent not to put all your eggs in one basket as 
one of the sites in the Youth Justice Custody Reinvestment Pathfinder did (Wong et al 
2013b). This site focussed on setting up and implementing Multi-systemic therapy (MST) 
as their main delivery model for reducing custody bed nights over a two year period, in 
spite of research evidence which suggested that the impact of MST on re-offending was 
unlikely to occur within the pilot period. 
 
As to what methodological approach to use in evaluating interventions which are part of 
the statutory offender management provision?  There are arguments that support an 
experimental paradigm, to see whether different interventions perform better or worse 
than the ‘standard’ offender management provision.  However, a limiting factor may be 
that the number of individuals in the intervention cohort may be insufficient to produce a 
statistically significant result and also that the time required to allow the experiment to 
play out may be too long to wait.  In this instance the Pawson Tilley context–mechanism-
outcome approach maybe more useful. 
 
However, in both instances, if the outcome that the intervention is aiming to effect is re-
offending as measured by PNC data, the problem of access arises. 
 
The establishment of the Justice Data Lab, as operated in the manner described above, 
would provide insufficient level of granularity to enable adequate learning to take place, 
aggregated results are of limited use, anonymised individualised data is required.  
However, accessing this, is perhaps more akin to trying to locate the holy grail than 
undertaking an impact evaluation itself – without the data it is not possible.  In addition, 
the Justice Data Lab is intended in the first instance to run as a one year pilot.  There is no 
guarantee that even access to this limited data will be available after April 2014. 
 
Until the MoJ is better resourced to provide ready access to this kind of data, the ability of 
providers to innovate and test out the effectiveness of their interventions on reducing 
reconvictions will be limited. 
 
An alternative approach may be for providers to adopt other measures of re-offending 
such as re-arrest rates, or re-imprisonment.  After all reconvictions are but one measure of 
re-offending. 
 
What next for IOM? 
While this article has primarily focussed on the technical aspects of evaluating IOM it is 
perhaps appropriate (given its currency) to consider the future of IOM arrangements as a 
result of the implementation of the Transforming Rehabilitation strategy.   The paragraph 
from the Target Operating Model for Transforming Rehabilitation (Ministry of Justice 
2013b) which references IOM (as part of a section which also references partnership 
working Police and Crime Commissioners) is reproduced below: 
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“To reduce re-offending, CRCs [Community Rehabilitation Companies] will 
need to work closely with other local partners, and in particular Police and 
Crime Commissioners. Bidders will need to evidence how they will engage 
with local partnerships, for example existing IOM arrangements. CRCs will 
be expected to work collaboratively with PCCs, with whom they are likely to 
engage through local Community Safety Partnership forums. As part of 
account management NOMS will require CRCs to provide assurance of their 
engagement in local partnerships where these are purposeful in maintaining 
performance, and will take into consideration feedback from stakeholders 
such as PCCs.” (Ministry of Justice 2013) 
 
The assumptions which underpin this and the risks are considered below. 
 
Investment in IOM 
There is a financial incentive to reduce re-offending built into the payment structure for 
the CRCs (Ministry of Justice 2013c). IOM arrangements have generally focussed on 
offenders at high risk of re-offending whether they are statutory or non-statutory 
offenders (as stated above) Therefore there  is a presumption that the CRC contract 
holders will want to maintain IOM in some form, in particular given the steer to do so 
within the Target Operating Model documentation. However, there are risks associated 
with this. 
 
The first risk is the likelihood of reduced investment in IOM from the CRC.  On the 26th 
June 2013, George Osborne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced further 
Government spending cuts. These are in addition to those already implemented between 
2010 and 2014.  The new reduction will be to be undertaken by 2015/16.  This will 
represent a further 10 percent reduction (compared to the 2014/15 baseline) in funding 
for the Ministry of Justice (Her Majesty’s Treasury 2013).  This suggests that the cost 
envelope for CRCs to deliver the same services that the Probation Trusts are currently 
delivering and commissioning will reduce. Probation are key players in IOM (Senior et al 
2011, Wong et al 2012) occupying a number of roles which include: managing IOM 
offenders directly; servicing IOM multi-agency arrangements; commissioning housing 
advice, ETE, gender specific services for women offenders and other provision which 
provide wrap around support for IOM offenders.  A reduced cost envelope has the 
potential to lead to a reduction in CRC investment in IOM, ironically one of the key policy 
areas championed in the Ministry of Justice 2010 vision for criminal justice delivery, 
“Breaking the Cycle: Effective punishment, rehabilitation and sentencing of offenders”. 
The second is reduced investment in IOM from other agencies. Existing funding for IOM 
schemes, to work with under 12 month sentenced prisoners released into the community 
may be discontinued.  This funding has been provided by community safety partnerships 
through Drugs Intervention Programme funding and/or other sources as noted by Senior 
et al (2011) and Wong et al (2013a).  The Target Operating Model (Ministry of Justice 
2013b) specifies that the contracted providers will be required to deliver a service to 
under 12 month sentenced prisoners – something that current probation staff are not 
statutorily required to do.  Community safety partnerships, managing reduced budgets 
may presume that their funding is no longer required.  Given that the cost envelope under 
which the contracted providers are likely to be operating will be lower than the existing 
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probation arrangements (due to further budget cuts at the Ministry of Justice), this 
community safety funding is more likely (rather than less likely) to be needed in order to 
maintain existing IOM provision. 
 
Reduced investment in IOM could also be compounded by political considerations. 
Depending on the configuration of successful Tier 1, 2 and 3 bidders for the CRC contracts, 
Police and Crime Commissioners and elected members (within local councils) with 
responsibility for community safety partnerships may be reluctant to invest in IOM 
arrangements where this means transferring funding away from local providers with 
perceived local expertise to non-incumbent providers from outside the local area but who 
are within the winning consortium.   
 
Culture of co-operation 
As noted by Senior and colleagues (2011): 
 
“The joining up of the key agencies was an essential feature of all IOM sites. 
Balanced centres of power between agencies were not always achieved 
within sites but respondents recognised the key roles played by all agencies 
and the central task of making this happen. At project level key individuals, 
experienced and committed to multi-agency working, were often significant 
drivers of good working practices on the ground. There was evidence too, 
where strategic individuals did not share a common view, relationships 
could become tense and counter-productive. At the root getting a good 
balance demanded core staffs were willing to think and work beyond agency 
boundaries.” (Senior et al 2011: 18) 
 
As this suggests, cooperativeness between agencies and individuals is a defining element 
of IOM.  Co-operation between local agencies following the bidding process for the CRC 
contracts, during and after the implementation of Transforming Rehabilitation has to 
some extent been presumed.  Arguably, this should not be taken for granted. This 
cooperativeness may be disrupted by Transforming Rehabilitation. 
 
Unsuccessful bidders for the CRC contracts may choose not to co-operate with the 
successful bidders.  This has occurred in other social policy areas where the marketization 
of services has taken place. For example, in the establishment of Community Legal Advice 
Centres, undertaken by the Legal Services Commission (Fox et al 2010).  These were 
intended to improve the co-ordination of legal advice services across housing, debt, 
welfare benefits and employment law.  In two sites16 where the contracts to deliver 
Community Legal Advice Centres (CLACs) were won by non-incumbent local providers, 
there was a culture of non-cooperation from unsuccessful bidders. Some of the 
unsuccessful bidders managed to secure funding to continue their services alongside the 
Legal Services Commission and local authority contracted provider. These services ran in 
parallel and arguably in competition (for the same clients) with the CLACs. 
                                                 
16 Four community legal advice centres or CLACs were set up by the LSC and local authorities.  Two 
contracts were won by local incumbent providers, two by non-incumbent providers. 
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The element of competition inherent in the Transforming Rehabilitation commissioning 
processes and the increasingly limited resources available to VCS agencies to work with 
offenders may exacerbate the competition which currently exists between them (Wong 
2013c). This may manifest itself in less engagement in IOM processes and being less 
willing to share effective practice, in case this enables them to retain with a competitive 
edge in securing future funding. 
 
Disruption due to change and increased complexity 
The implementation of Transforming Rehabilitation itself is likely to be disruptive on IOM 
arrangements, irrespective of any of the above issues of reduced investment and 
cooperativeness.  Disruption to IOM is also likely due to the added complexity of the 
information sharing arrangements for offenders arising from the separation between the 
CRC and National Probation Service. The risks of this fragmentation are captured by the 
response to the Transforming Rehabilitation proposals from the Police and Crime 
Commissioner for Gloucestershire. 
 
“Fragmentation of the supervision of offenders, with the public provider 
responsible for high risk and MAPPA cases and the contracted provider 
responsible for low and medium risk offenders, would increase the 
complexity of information exchange and fracture the continuity of offender 
supervision, adding substantially to the risk of public protection failures.” 
(Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner Gloucestershire 2013: 7) 
 
Conclusion 
The experience of evaluating IOM has highlighted the challenges of generating robust 
evaluation evidence of its effectiveness.  There are numerous reasons for this, which 
include tightly defining the intervention/process in such a way that the additionality of 
IOM can be measured in terms of impact on reconvictions and cost effectiveness.  Other 
reasons are the contract research context in which such evaluations have been 
undertaken, where satisficing research stakeholders may involve choosing less rigorous 
methods of measurement and/or highlighting measures that are less rigorous but are 
easier to understand.  There are clearly limitations to the use of experimental and quasi 
experimental approaches to evaluating criminal justice interventions such as IOM, it is 
important that the results of any quantitative analysis are understood in relation the 
context in which the intervention was delivered and a thorough understanding of the 
mechanisms underpinning the intervention. 
 
The impending implementation of the Transforming Rehabilitation strategy and the black 
box approach which the PbR commissioning of offender management services for low to 
medium risk offender represents, the onus will be on tier 1, 2 and 3 providers to generate 
their own evidence of effectiveness to enable them deliver the outcome target – reducing 
re-offending. 
 
Where providers choose to do this and there is no guarantee that all providers will, their 
efforts to assess impact will be hampered by their access to PNC data unless a dedicated 
capacity is made available by the MoJ to provide the anonymised individualised data.  
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As to the impact of the implementation of the Transforming Rehabilitation strategy on 
IOM, there are potential risks to the continued delivery of IOM due to reduced 
investment, non-co-operation by agencies, the disruptive nature of the changes 
themselves and the impact on information sharing due to the fragmentation of offender 
management provision. 
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